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economics as a source of national power

John A. Cloud

War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, by Robert
D. Blackwill and Jennifer Harris. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2016. 384 pages. $29.95.

In War by Other Means, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris are striving to put
the e (for economics) back into the playbook of American power. They argue that
the “military-heavy approach” the United States has taken over the past fifteen
years is inappropriate to respond to the challenges we face today, which they
see coming not from terrorism but from what they call “geoeconomics.” In fact,
Blackwill and Harris argue that the “current tools of U.S. statecraft, dominated by
traditional political-military might, are uniquely unsuited” (p. 7). For example,
on an issue on which I have written previously,* they note that there has been “no
comparable discussion in Washington of returning Ukraine to economic viability
as a way to check . . . Putin” (p. 2). They appear to agree with many of our military
leaders, who argue that we need to use all our tools of national power (usually
described as DIME, for diplomacy, information, military, and economics) to meet
future challenges.
Blackwill and Harris focus on the use of economic power to achieve geopolitical, not economic, objectives. This is what they term “geoeconomics.” The book is
replete with examples of not only how the United States used to use geoeconomics but how our so-called near-peer competitors, particularly China and Russia,
are using it today as an asymmetric method to accomplish their foreign policy
objectives. The authors argue that the United States has neglected this area since
Vietnam. While they see it as essential that we become more skilled in the use
of geoeconomics, they acknowledge that we will not necessarily be as nimble as
China and Russia, given the greater control the Chinese and Russian regimes
have over their respective economies.
In taking this position, the authors demonstrate the courage to be out of step
within the current political debate. While both
Ambassador John A. Cloud (Ret.) is a professor of
parties’ nominees are critical of trade deals and of
national security affairs at the Naval War College.
using economics for noneconomic ends, BlackDuring his diplomatic career, he served as U.S. amwill and Harris strongly promote exactly that.
bassador to Lithuania and as senior director of international economics on the National Security Council
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Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the successful conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP).
In another area in which the authors defy conventional wisdom, Blackwill and
Harris press for the United States to move significant (but unspecified) budgetary
funds from the U.S. military to the State Department and other agencies involved
in geoeconomics. At a time when the political class is arguing for more money
for the military, they argue that “the United States too often reaches for the gun
instead of the purse in its international conduct.” They further ask, “[W]hat, in
power-projection terms, is the United States getting for all of this military spending?” (p. 221).
Blackwill and Harris are up-front in claiming that China is “America’s most
important foreign policy challenge” (p. 179). They see China as the “leading
practitioner of geoeconomics” (p. 11). Their chapter “Geoeconomics in Chinese
Foreign Policy” is particularly compelling as it outlines five different uses of geoeconomic tools by China to advance its interests in Taiwan, North Korea, Japan,
and Southeast Asia and in its relationships with Pakistan and India. They note
that “nations do not fear China’s military might; they fear its ability to give or
withhold trade and investments” (p. 94).
The authors spend considerable time discussing the energy revolution and
the effects of high commodity prices. It is unclear to me how the recent decline
of both energy and commodity prices affects their argument. However, I would
agree that the use of innovative ways to recover petroleum products—if a sufficient equilibrium price can be found—should have profound implications for
the potential for the United States to use geoeconomics.
Blackwill and Harris argue that the United States no longer uses geoeconomics. On the basis of my experience, I disagree. If that were the case, most of the
George W. Bush trade negotiations would not have happened. The authors do
acknowledge that the trade agreements with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Morocco had
counterterrorism goals (p. 175). I would argue that all these agreements had geopolitical as well as economic goals. In fact, it was not until the agreement with
South Korea that we had an agreement with significant economic purpose, even
though this agreement had important geopolitical goals as well.
Blackwill and Harris also argue that the TPP “was conceived primarily as
an economic project” (p. 181). I again disagree. Where I would agree with the
authors is that the geoeconomic aspects of these agreements are prominent at
their conception and at the end; they are of lesser import in the middle. While
the National Security Council system and staff were deeply involved in picking
the countries and launching the negotiations, once launched the negotiations
quickly devolved to being run by the responsible departments, and the organizational behavior of these departments took over. At that point, the agenda of the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/14
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Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Departments of Agriculture
and Commerce, their respective congressional committees, and USTR’s congressionally mandated advisory committees took precedence over our geopolitical
goals. This is, in part, because of the narrow congressional majorities that have
supported these agreements in the recent past. Our trade negotiators cannot afford to alienate any interest group that could tip the scales against an agreement.
It was only in the endgame that the geopolitical aspects became prominent again.
Another example would be U.S. assistance to eastern Central Europe during
the administration of George H. W. Bush—an issue in which Ambassador Blackwill was deeply involved. The United States used economic tools to help integrate
these countries into the West and, indirectly, into the European Community. It
was only later that the military and NATO became our major tool of integration.
The authors, in their review of the history of U.S. use of geoeconomics, date its
decline to Vietnam. I would argue that it was Congress’s creation of the Special
Trade Representative in the Trade Act of 1962 that precipitated this decline. At
that time, Congress removed the trade negotiating lead from the State Department
—an agency with geopolitical responsibilities—and put it in the White House.
This was done, according to Blackwill and Harris, because “congressional leaders
complained that the State Department neither understood nor represented U.S.
economic interests” (p. 169).
Blackwill and Harris attribute this change not to Congress but to economic
insecurity and to U.S. policy makers who “began to see economics as its own distinctive realm, to be protected from the whims of statecraft” (p. 153). The authors
argue that U.S. economists have succeeded in separating economic policy from
national security policy (p. 6). I suspect that this statement surprises no one more
than U.S. economists. Yes, U.S. economists argue for wise economic policies.
They argue against geoeconomic measures that could undermine the fundamental strength of the U.S. economy. As we learned during the Clinton administration, they are mindful of the import of bond traders and others who influence the
economy. But in my experience, economists do not see economic policy as a distinct area in which national security goals have no legitimacy. I frequently found
that when policy makers were averse to using economic tools it was because those
tools were either bureaucratically difficult or their implementation, timing, and
effect were believed to be less certain than those of other means.
Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris have written a timely and compelling
book that provides an important contrary perspective for U.S. national security
policy making. It will be fascinating to watch whether and how these ideas get
incorporated into the next administration’s national security policy.
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